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KALEY v. UNITED STATES: SANCTIFYING GRAND JURY 
DETERMINATIONS AND MARGINALIZING THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
LAURA MERKEY* 
In Kaley v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 or 
the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel3 entitles defend-
ants to a pretrial hearing to challenge a grand jury’s determination of 
probable cause supporting the charges against them.4  A grand jury 
indictment establishes that there is probable cause to believe that an 
individual has committed a crime, and in some cases, can permit an 
individual’s assets to be seized.  The seizure of assets can leave the in-
dividual without sufficient funds to retain the legal counsel of his or 
her choice.5 
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 1.  134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014).  
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4.  Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1094.  
 5.  The authority for such a criminal forfeiture is derived from the criminal forfeiture 
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012).  The statute provides for the forfeiture of “(1) any property 
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as 
the result of [the] violation; (2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, 
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, [the] violation.”  Id. 
§ 853(a).  The statute also applies the forfeiture of such property to those who have been 
indicted for an applicable crime, if “(i) there is a substantial probability that the United 
States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order [of forfei-
ture] will result in the property being destroyed, removed from jurisdiction of the court, 
or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability 
of the property through [forfeiture] outweighs the hardship on any party against whom 
the order is to be entered.”  Id. § 853(e).   
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The Court concluded that the Constitution does not give the de-
fendants a right to a pretrial hearing to relitigate the grand jury’s 
finding of probable cause.6  Although the Kaley Court came to the 
correct holding, the Court erred in concluding that the issue hinged 
on the finality of the grand jury’s determination.7  For the purposes of 
clarity and finality, the Court should have instead focused on the ab-
sence of such a hearing consequently limiting the defendant’s right to 
counsel of choice, which precedent has shown to be a right separate 
and distinct from the right to effective counsel.8  As the right to coun-
sel of choice is qualified, the infringement of the right caused by a 
denial of a pretrial hearing to contest probable cause is insufficient to 
generate a constitutional violation.9 
I.  THE CASE 
In January 2005, Kerri Kaley was informed that she and her hus-
band, Brian Kaley, were under grand jury investigation for stealing 
prescription medical devices from hospitals and selling them on the 
black market.10  Both Kerri and Brian Kaley retained separate attor-
neys who informed them that the cumulative cost of their legal fees 
would be approximately $500,000.11  The Kaleys responded by obtain-
ing a home equity line of credit for $500,000 on their residence and 
then used the proceeds to buy a certificate of deposit.12 
Two years later, in February 2007, a grand jury in the Southern 
District of Florida indicted the Kaleys on seven counts, including con-
spiracy to transport in interstate commerce prescription medical de-
vices that they knew to be stolen.13  The indictment sought criminal 
forfeiture14 of all of the Kaleys’ property traceable to the offenses, in-
cluding the certificate of deposit.15  The district court granted the 
government’s protective order, and the Kaleys moved to vacate, argu-
ing that the order prevented them from retaining the counsel of their 
                                                        
 6.  Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1094.  
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1090 
(2014).  At the time, Kerri Kaley was working as a sales representative for Ethicon Endo-
Surgery.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  The Kaleys were also indicted on five counts of substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2314 
charges and one count of obstruction of justice.  Id. 
 14.  21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012). 
 15.  Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318. 
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choice in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights.16  They also filed 
a motion expressly requesting a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary 
hearing.17  In May 2007, the magistrate judge issued an order finding 
probable cause that the certificate of deposit and the Kaleys’ resi-
dence were involved in the violations, another order amending the 
protective order to include the full value of the certificate of deposit 
and the Kaleys’ residence, and a third order denying the Kaleys’ mo-
tion to vacate the protective order and hold a pretrial, post-restraint 
evidentiary hearing.18 
The Kaleys appealed the orders, and the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed, concluding that 
the trial itself would satisfy due process.19  On June 27, 2007, the 
Kaleys lodged an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s 
decision.20  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the district court’s denial of the evidentiary hearing and remanded 
for further proceedings.21  On remand, the district court found that 
the hearing was required.22 
During the evidentiary hearing conducted on July 29, 2010, the 
Kaleys focused on the scope of the hearing; they explained that they 
were not contesting the traceability of the assets to the alleged con-
duct, but were instead arguing that the underlying facts did not even 
support the crimes with which they were charged.23  The government 
                                                        
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  A magistrate judge heard the initial motion raised by the Kaleys and sustained 
the protective order, but the judge limited the scope of the order as it applied to the certif-
icate of deposit to $140,000.  Id.  A month later, the grand jury returned a superseding in-
dictment that added an additional count for money laundering and sought criminal forfei-
ture of the full certificate of deposit, as well as the Kaleys’ residence.  Id.  On April 17, 
2007, the Kaleys renewed their motion to vacate the initial, amended protective order; it 
was in this motion that they expressly requested a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hear-
ing.  Id.  The magistrate responded to the motion by ordering the prosecutor to submit an 
affidavit supporting probable cause.  Id.  The prosecutor filed an affidavit executed by the 
FBI case agent, in secret and under seal, and in response to this affidavit the magistrate 
judge issued the three orders denying the Kaleys’ motions.  Id. at 1318–19.  
 18.  Id. at 1318–19. 
 19.  Id. at 1319. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009), appeal after remand, 
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012), aff’d, Kaley v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 1090 (2014) (“[T]he district court plainly made an error of law in interpreting and ap-
plying the third of the Bissell factors. . . . Moreover, the district court did not make a clear 
finding as to the fourth Bissell factor . . . .  We, therefore, reverse the district court’s deci-
sion and remand the case to the district court . . . .”). 
 22.  Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1319. 
 23.  Id.  
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in return argued that it was not required to offer substantive evidence 
to establish the criminal charges, but that it was only required to 
prove that the restrained assets were traceable to the offenses charged 
in the indictment.24  In October 2010, the district court issued an or-
der denying the Kaleys’ motion to vacate the protective order, con-
cluding that the only relevant inquiry was the traceability of the as-
sets.25  The Kaleys appealed three days later, and the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the Kaleys’ motion to vacate the 
protective order was properly denied.26  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether due process or the right to 
counsel constitutionally entitles criminal defendants to contest a 
grand jury’s prior determination of probable cause to believe they 
committed the crimes charged at a post-indictment pretrial hearing.27 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court has created arguably blurry 
lines demarcating the scope and parameters of the Sixth Amendment 
right to assistance of counsel as well as the Fifth Amendment right to 
due process.  Part II.A.1 of this Note discusses how the Court has 
granted both expansive domain to the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel, while simultaneously significantly qualifying the right.28  Part 
II.A.2 discusses how the Court has determined that the criminal for-
feiture statute29 implicates the qualified right to counsel of choice, in 
contrast to the separate and distinct right to adequate counsel.30  Part 
II.B examines how the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
has complicated the analysis, particularly in light of the broad defer-
ence given to the grand jury institution.31  Part II.C focuses on the 
case law generated from the consideration of these issues, which has 
produced even less clarity as to where these lines are drawn and re-
sulted in a split among the circuit courts over the permissive scope of 
a pretrial hearing.32 
                                                        
 24.  Id. at 1319–20.  
 25.  Id. at 1320. 
 26.  Id. at 1330 (holding that the order was properly denied on the grounds that “a 
defendant may not challenge the evidentiary support for the underlying charge at a hear-
ing to determine the propriety of a post-indictment pretrial restraining order”).  
 27.  Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1095, 1096 (2014).  
 28.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 29.  21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012). 
 30.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 31.  See infra Part II.B. 
 32.  See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  The Criminal Forfeiture Statute Does Not Violate the Sixth 
Amendment 
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted expansive 
domain to the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel but has also signif-
icantly qualified the right in specific situations.33  The Court has de-
termined that the criminal forfeiture statute implicates the qualified 
right to counsel of choice, rather than the separate and distinct right 
to adequate counsel.34  Therefore, the pretrial seizure of assets, even 
though it may restrict a defendant’s ability to obtain the counsel of his 
or her choice, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.35 
1.  The United States Supreme Court Has Granted Expansive Domain 
to the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel but Has Similarly 
Created Significant Qualifications to This Right 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual the right “to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”36  The Court has clari-
fied the parameters of this right in several seminal cases, one of the 
earliest being Powell v. Alabama,37 a case that involved nine African-
American men who were charged and convicted of raping two white 
women on a train heading to Scottsboro, Alabama in 1931.38  As the 
Powell Court noted, the defendants were not represented by counsel 
upon arraignment, and no lawyer had been specifically named until 
the morning of the trial.39  The Court reversed the convictions, hold-
ing that in a capital case in which a defendant is unable to employ his 
own counsel, it is “the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to 
assign counsel for him” and emphasized that it must be done in a 
time and manner to ensure effective aid before and during the trial.40  
The Court also emphasized that “the failure of the trial court to give 
                                                        
 33.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 34.  See infra Part II A.1. 
 35.  See infra Part II A.2. 
 36.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 37.  287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 38.  Id. at 49–51. 
 39.  Id. at 56.  The Court also noted that the appointment of counsel—supposedly an 
appointment of all members of the bar to the defense—was “little more than an expansive 
gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligation upon any one” and that prior to the 
trial one of the members of the bar had accepted employment for the prosecution.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 71.  
  
382 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:377 
[the defendants] reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel 
was a clear denial of due process.”41 
In Strickland v. Washington,42 the Supreme Court further expand-
ed the right to counsel by considering the quality of counsel as part of 
that right.43  The Court explained that the adequacy of an accused’s 
counsel is a crucial part of the constitutional right to a fair trial, as 
recognized in the Sixth Amendment.44  The Court reasoned that “ac-
cess to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defend-
ants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to 
which they are entitled.”45  The Court then explained that whether 
counsel is ineffective to the point of giving rise to a constitutional vio-
lation is determined by whether or not the defendant has received a 
fair trial.46  To measure this violation, the Strickland Court held that 
two factors are to be considered: first, showing that counsel was defi-
cient, having made errors so serious that counsel could no longer be 
considered “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and se-
cond, proving that this deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense.47  The Strickland test has become the standard to determine the 
threshold for insufficient counsel.48 
The Court demonstrated that the right to counsel can be quali-
fied, however, in Wheat v. United States.49  The case raised the issue of 
whether it was within the district court’s discretion to decline a de-
fendant’s voluntary waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel by re-
                                                        
 41.  Id. (“In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion—the igno-
rance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, 
the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the 
fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them 
necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives—we think 
the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure coun-
sel was a clear denial of due process.”).  
 42.  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 43.  Id. at 685. 
 44.  Id. at 685–86.  
 45.  Id. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 
(1942)).  
 46.  Id. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial pro-
cess that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”).  
 47.  Id. at 687.  
 48.  See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (holding that the Alabama 
courts did not correctly apply the Strickland test to the defendant’s case); Chaidez v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (explaining that the Court has granted relief under Strick-
land in diverse contexts); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (explaining how to ap-
ply Strickland’s prejudice test in the context of plea offers).  
 49.  486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
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fusing to permit his proposed substitution of counsel.50  The Court 
explained that the essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to “guar-
antee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to 
ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer 
whom he prefers.”51  Thus, the Court held that the deference to a pe-
titioner’s preferred counsel of choice can be overcome by showing 
the potential for a conflict.52 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,53 the Court demonstrated that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is a qualified right, 
both separate and distinct from the right to effective counsel.54  In 
Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distrib-
ute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, and his family hired a Mis-
souri attorney, John Fahle, to represent him.55  Gonzalez-Lopez also 
contacted and hired a California lawyer, Joseph Low, to represent 
him, but during the course of an evidentiary hearing the judge re-
voked Low’s provisional acceptance to appear in court because he vio-
lated a court rule.56  Despite repeated efforts, Low was unable to re-
gain permission to represent the defendant.57  The jury found the 
defendant guilty, and he appealed.58  The Eighth Circuit vacated the 
conviction, holding that the district court misinterpreted the rule that 
Low violated, on which the court based its denials of his motions for 
                                                        
 50.  Id. at 154. 
 51.  Id. at 159. 
 52.  Id. at 164 (“The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of petition-
er’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstra-
tion of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict.  The evaluation 
of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to 
the informed judgment of the trial court.”).  
 53.  548 U.S. 140 (2006).  
 54.  Id. at 142.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id.  The Magistrate Judge found Joseph Low to have violated the court rule re-
stricting the cross-examination of a witness to one counsel because he was passing notes to 
John Fahle during cross-examination.  Id.  
 57.  Acting on the respondent’s wishes, Low filed two successive applications for admis-
sion, both of which were denied by the district court, and an appeal, which was dismissed 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  Id.  Fahle filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel, which was granted, and respondent retained a local attorney, Karl 
Dickhaus, to represent him for his trial.  Id. at 142–43.  Low again applied for and was de-
nied permission for admission and was ordered to have no contact with Dickhaus during 
proceedings.  Id. at 143.  A United States Marshal sat between Low and Dickhaus at trial to 
enforce the court order.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 143. 
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admittance, and therefore violated respondent’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of his choice.59 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and subsequently held 
that no additional showing of prejudice sustained by the defendant is 
required when deprivation of counsel is erroneous and that such an 
error requires the Court to vacate the conviction.60  The Court, how-
ever, was careful to point out the distinction between the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective representation and the right to select 
counsel of one’s choice, the latter being violated “whenever the de-
fendant’s choice is wrongfully denied.”61  The Court explained that 
these are two separate rights, and the deprivation of the right to one’s 
counsel of choice is complete when a defendant is erroneously de-
prived of the counsel that he chooses to represent him, regardless of 
the quality of that representation.62  The Court also reiterated that a 
violation of an individual’s right to counsel of his or her choice does 
not extend to those defendants who require counsel to be appointed 
for them and cited several other legitimate qualifications on the right 
to choice of counsel.63 
2.  The United States Supreme Court Determined That the Forfeiture 
Statute Does Not Exempt Legal Fees and Is Constitutional 
The Supreme Court has addressed challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 853, in 
the right to counsel context in two cases, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered 
v. United States64 and United States v. Monsanto,65 both decided on the 
same day.  The statute provides for pretrial seizure of any assets held 
by an individual convicted or indicted on the crimes specified, pro-
vided those assets are found traceable to the crime.66  Monsanto ad-
dressed the question of whether the forfeiture statute authorized the 
district court to enter a pretrial order freezing assets in a defendant’s 
possession, even when the defendant seeks to use those assets to pay 
                                                        
 59.  Id. at 143–44. 
 60.  Id. at 144, 146, 152.  
 61.  Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted). 
 62.  Id. at 147–48. 
 63.  Id. at 151–52 (noting that a defendant may not be represented by counsel who is 
not a member of the bar or demand that a court grant his waiver of conflict-free represen-
tation) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988); Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 626 (1989)). 
 64.  491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
 65.  491 U.S. 600 (1989), remanded to 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 66.  21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012). 
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an attorney, and if so, whether such an order was constitutional.67  
Caplin & Drysdale addressed the similar question of whether the for-
feiture statute includes an exemption for assets that a defendant wish-
es to use to pay an attorney in the criminal case where forfeiture ex-
ists, and if the statute, as interpreted without such an exemption, is 
constitutional in light of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.68 
Both holdings, which cited each other, agreed that the district 
court is authorized to enter such a pretrial order freezing the defend-
ant’s assets, that there is not an exemption for assets needed to pay 
for legal fees, and that the statute is not a violation of either the Fifth 
or Sixth Amendments.69  The Monsanto opinion explained that the 
text of the statute is clear and unambiguous in its failure to exclude 
assets that could be used to pay an attorney from forfeiture.70  The 
Court also looked to the construction of the statute’s text and noted 
that the language of “[Section] 853(e)(1)(A) is plainly aimed at im-
plementing the commands of [Section] 853(a) and cannot sensibly 
be construed to give the district court discretion to permit the dissipa-
tion of the very property that [Section] 853(a) requires be forfeited 
upon conviction.”71  The Monsanto opinion also examined the legisla-
tive history of the statute, finding that the foremost objective in draft-
ing the statute was to preserve the availability of the property in ques-
tion and to ensure that defendants do not profit from criminal acts.72 
In its discussion, the Monsanto opinion deferred to the Caplin & 
Drysdale opinion, which specifically addressed the lack of Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment violations raised by the statute’s authorization of 
pretrial criminal forfeiture of assets intended to be used to pay legal 
counsel.73  The Caplin & Drysdale opinion explained that a defendant 
cannot give good title to his or her assets, even if used to pay an attor-
ney, because the assets were vested in the United States at the time 
                                                        
 67.  Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 602. 
 68.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619. 
 69.  See id. at 623; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 602, 614 (“In another decision we announce 
today, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, . . . we hold that neither the Fifth nor 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires Congress to permit a defendant to use 
assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay that defendant’s legal fees.  We rely on our conclu-
sion in that case to dispose of the similar constitutional claims raised by the respondent 
here.”).   
 70.  Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 608–09. 
 71.  Id. at 612–13.  
 72.  Id. at 613–14 (noting that “this view is supported by the relevant legislative history” 
and that Congress’ intent, as well as the statute’s text itself, makes it clear that “the statute, 
as presently written, cannot be read any other way”).  
 73.  Id. at 614 (explaining that “[w]e rely on our conclusion in [Caplin & Drysdale] to 
dispose of the similar constitutional claims raised by respondent here”). 
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the criminal act giving rise to the forfeiture took place.74  The Court 
also conducted a balancing test and concluded that the “strong gov-
ernmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets” 
outweighs “any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting criminals to 
use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense.”75  The Caplin 
& Drysdale Court similarly disposed of the Fifth Amendment chal-
lenge, which it summarized as the accusation that the power available 
to prosecutors under the forfeiture provision could potentially be 
abused, resulting in a violation of due process.76  The Court conclud-
ed that just because the provision could be abused does not by itself 
make the law facially invalid.77  Additionally, as several circuit courts 
later noted, the Monsanto Court explicitly stated that it was not con-
sidering “whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing before a 
pretrial restraining order can be imposed.”78 
B.  The Role of the Grand Jury Is a Key Component in Defining the Scope 
of the Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process in the Context of the 
Criminal Forfeiture Statute 
 The Fifth Amendment provides in part that, “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
                                                        
 74.  Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 627.  The Court also noted that there is no “distinc-
tion between, or hierarchy among, constitutional rights” and that as a defendant has no 
similar right to spend forfeitable assets on the right to free speech, to practice one’s reli-
gion, or to travel, which also depend on finances, it would therefore be illogical to make 
an exception in this case for the right to counsel.  Id. at 628. 
 75.  Id. at 631.  
 76.  See id. at 633–34 (explaining that even if “the Fifth Amendment provides some 
added protection not encompassed in the Sixth Amendment’s more specific provisions,” 
the Constitution “does not forbid the imposition of an otherwise permissible criminal 
sanction, such as forfeiture, merely because in some cases prosecutors may abuse the pro-
cesses available to them”). 
 77.  Id. at 634. 
 78.  Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 615 n.10; see, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 
416 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Monsanto Court “left open for the circuit’s decision 
on remand” whether such a hearing is required by due process); United States v. Jamieson, 
427 F.3d 394, 406 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Monsanto Court “specifically re-
frained from ruling on whether due process requires such a probable cause hearing”); 
United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 803 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the Monsanto 
Court “expressly left open” whether the Fifth Amendment requires the pretrial hearing); 
United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that its holding is 
“not at odds” with the Supreme Court because neither the Monsanto nor the Caplin & 
Drysdale Court decided whether due process requires a hearing allowing the challenge to 
whether or not the assets are forfeitable); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1190–
91 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Monsanto Court “declined . . . to address the proce-
dural aspects of such a pretrial restraint of property” and remanded the case for further 
proceedings). 
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law . . . .”79  The Supreme Court has held that at the very least, the 
Due Process Clause requires that such deprivations be preceded by 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.80  A 
traditional function of the grand jury is to screen for unfounded crim-
inal charges.81  The role of the grand jury, as it has been defined by 
the courts, is therefore a key component in defining the scope of the 
Fifth Amendment right to Due Process as it applies to the Criminal 
Forfeiture Statute.  
In Costello v. United States,82 the Supreme Court examined whether 
a grand jury indictment could be challenged on the basis that the on-
ly type of evidence presented was hearsay.83  The Court looked to the 
Constitution in its analysis and found it to be silent on the types of ev-
idence upon which grand juries may or may not act.84  The Court also 
considered the history of the grand jury and explained that grand ju-
rors have traditionally acted on their own knowledge, “unfettered by 
technical rules.”85  The Costello Court thus held that “[a]n indictment 
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury” is enough 
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, even if the only evidence before the 
grand jury was hearsay.86 
Less than two years later, the Supreme Court was again asked to 
establish a rule which would allow a grand jury indictment to be chal-
lenged on the grounds of inadequate evidence in Lawn v. United 
States.87  The Lawn Court refused to establish such a rule, noting that 
“this Court has several times ruled that an indictment returned by a 
legally constituted nonbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face . . . sat-
                                                        
 79.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 80.  See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) 
(holding that at a minimum the Due Process Clause requires that deprivation of life, liber-
ty or property be proceeded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the 
case). 
81.  See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (explaining that the grand jury 
“has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and op-
pressive persecution”).  
 82.  350 U.S. 359 (1956).  
 83.  Id. at 359. 
 84.  Id. at 362 (“But neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provi-
sion prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act.”). 
 85.  Id. at 362–64.   
 86.  Id. at 361, 363. 
 87.  355 U.S. 339 (1958).  The Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision, holding that the defendants were not deprived 
of due process by the refusal to hold a hearing to investigate whether the grand jury con-
sidered certain evidence when it returned the indictment.  Id. at 348–50. 
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isfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”88  The Court was al-
so careful to distinguish the case at hand from a case dealing with “in-
competent or illegal evidence in a trial on the merits,” and instead 
held that the situation conformed with the precedent set in Costello.89 
The unassailability of grand jury indictments was further affirmed 
in Bracy v. United States,90 in which a witness admitted to having com-
mitted perjury during the grand jury proceedings that led to the in-
dictment of the defendant.91  The Court denied the petition for certi-
orari review and a request to stay the enforcement of the judgment.92  
Again, in United States v. Calandra,93 the Court further bolstered the 
grand jury’s invulnerability by refusing to extend the exclusionary 
rule to grand jury proceedings.94  In its holding, the Court empha-
sized that allowing witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a 
grand jury would expose issues reserved for the trial and delay pro-
ceedings.95  The Court explained that such suppression hearings 
would require extended litigation that would transform the hearing 
into a trial on the merits and potentially fatally delay the enforcement 
of criminal law.96 
Over thirty years after Costello, the Supreme Court again rein-
forced the finality of grand jury determinations in United States v. Wil-
liams97 by holding that a facially valid indictment may not be dismissed 
because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury.98  The Court found that the Tenth Circuit’s attempt to re-
quire a mandatory disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the grand ju-
ry was unsupported by its supervisory power.99  The Court explained 
that because the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, 
there is no supervisory judicial authority over the conduct of the 
                                                        
 88.  Id. at 349. 
 89.  Id. at 349–50.   
 90.  435 U.S. 1301 (1978). 
 91.  Id. at 1301. 
 92.  Id. at 1301, 1303.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the principle that the func-
tion of the grand jury is not to “sit to determine the truth of the charges brought” but in-
stead “only to determine whether there is probable cause to believe them true.”  Id. at 
1302. 
 93.  414 U.S. 338 (1974).  
 94.  Id. at 354 (“In the context of a grand jury proceeding, we believe that the damage 
to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule urged by 
respondent outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect.”).   
 95.  Id. at 349. 
 96.  Id. at 350. 
 97.  504 U.S. 36 (1992).  
 98.  Id. at 55. 
 99.  Id. at 45–47.  
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grand jury, and the courts therefore cannot prescribe standards for 
the grand jury to follow in their proceedings.100 
Through this progression of cases, by a process of elimination 
and rejecting grounds for potential evidentiary challenges, the Su-
preme Court has made it clear that the primary method by which to 
invalidate a grand jury indictment is to allege that the grand jury was 
illegally constituted, such as in cases of purposeful discrimination.101  
Even then, it is an uphill battle; multiple courts have found the bur-
den of proof of discrimination to be on the defendant102 and the fail-
ure to raise a discrimination challenge in a timely manner to be the 
equivalent of waiver.103  In short, the sanctity of the grand jury’s role 
in making determinations of probable cause is well established and 
difficult to assail. 
The Supreme Court has also used a balancing test introduced in 
Mathews v. Eldridge104 to further determine the scope of the Due Pro-
                                                        
 100.  See id. at 46–47 (“[T]he supervisory power can be used to dismiss an indictment 
because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that misconduct amounts to a 
violation of one of those ‘few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this 
Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.’” (quoting 
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986))).   
 101.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a defendant to move to dismiss a 
grand jury indictment on the basis that it was not “lawfully drawn, summoned, or selected.”  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(1).  Selection procedures of a grand or petit jury may be challenged 
on the basis of discrimination on account of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin or 
economic status.”  28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (2012).   
 102.  United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 657 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the burden 
is on the defendant to show a “substantial failure” in proportional representation which is 
greater than “[m]ere technical violations”); see also United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 
730, 733 (9th Cir. 1974) (explaining that defendants have the burden of showing prima 
facie discrimination in jury selection); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. 
La. 1973), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
defendants must show “substantial failure” of complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1867, resulting in 
an intentional underrepresentation). 
 103.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that failure 
to move to dismiss an indictment before the voir dire examination begins, or within seven 
days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, 
the grounds therefore constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the racial composition 
of the grand jury which indicted him); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 
1976) (explaining that when the defendant accepts the jury, he waives the right to object 
to any errors in the jury selection process); Ward v. United States, 486 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 
1973) (holding that the appellant waived his right to challenge the racial composition of 
the grand jury that indicted him by failing to raise the issue by motion before trial).   
 104.  424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The Mathews Court considered whether due process re-
quired an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of an individual’s Social Security 
benefit payments.  Id. at 323.  The Government in Kaley argued that because of the Court’s 
recent decision in Medina v. California, which held that the Mathews test was not the appro-
priate framework for addressing the validity of state procedural rules that are part of the 
criminal process, the Mathews test is similarly not applicable to determinations of the valid-
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cess Clause.105  Mathews raised the issue of when an individual’s Fifth 
Amendment due process guarantee requires that an individual be 
given an opportunity to contest administrative action prior to the im-
plementation of these actions.106  The Mathews Court held that due 
process requires the consideration of three factors: the private inter-
est that will be affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of this interest through the procedures used and the 
probable value of any procedural safeguards, and the Government’s 
interest, including the burden that the additional safeguard would 
entail.107  The Court explained the necessity of the test by rationaliz-
ing that the “essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person 
in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him 
and opportunity to meet it.’”108 
The Court also reasoned that precedent has consistently held 
that some form of hearing has generally been required before an in-
dividual is permanently deprived of a property interest.109  The Court 
also noted, however, that due process is not a “technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances” and 
that it is “flexible” and requires situation-specific protections.110  As a 
result of these concerns, and the factors considered in precedent, the 
Mathews Court established the three-factor test to ensure accuracy and 
to ultimately satisfy due process.111 
                                                        
ity of criminal forfeiture orders.  Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014) (cit-
ing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)).  The Kaley Court declined to “define the 
respective reach of Mathews and Medina, because we need not do so.”  Id. 
 105.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 334–35. 
 108.  Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  
 109.  Id. at 333.  The Mathews Court further explained that “Eldridge agrees that the 
review procedures available to a claimant before the initial determination of ineligibility 
becomes final would be adequate if disability benefits were not terminated until after the 
evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process.  The dispute centers upon what 
process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending review.”  Id.  The Court 
has also held that in some cases due process does not guarantee any process to an individ-
ual because the violation could not be predicted.  See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) 
(holding that even though the respondent, an inmate of a Nebraska prison, was perma-
nently deprived of his property, the deprivation was not the result of an established state 
procedure but the failure of the state agents to follow the established procedure, and thus 
due process could be adequately satisfied by a subsequent tort claim). 
 110.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111.  Id. at 334–35 (holding that “our prior decisions indicate that identification of the 
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”).  
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The Mathews balancing test has been applied by several of the 
circuits to determine the necessity of a pretrial hearing to contest the 
seizure of assets under the criminal forfeiture statute.112  The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.,113 
noted that the lack of an opportunity to have an evidentiary, adversary 
hearing could potentially give rise to a due process infringement, par-
ticularly in instances when the seizure led to an inability to retain 
counsel of choice.114  The Appellants, however, requested an eviden-
tiary hearing to address the existence of probable cause, and the 
Court of Appeals also recognized that in some cases “it may be impos-
sible to afford a full adversarial hearing” before seizure.115  The Court 
of Appeals also noted that the government may have rights in the 
property at issue that require immediate action.116  The determination 
of whether a due process violation would occur, the court concluded, 
required “further inquiry.”117  Furthermore, as the Mathews test had 
been previously employed in situations of “protected interests” 
threatened by official action, and other circuits had used the test in 
cases involving criminal forfeiture, the E-Gold court held that applica-
tion of the Mathews test was required.118 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also 
concluded, in United States v. Moya-Gomez,119 that in order to determine 
if a party’s Fifth Amendment right to due process is violated by refus-
ing an immediate post-restraint hearing, the Mathews test must be ap-
plied to the facts of the case.120  The court first determined that the 
forfeiture caused the defendant to suffer a deprivation of property in 
the constitutional sense.121  The court then asked whether the depri-
                                                        
 112.  See, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the Second Circuit applied the three Mathews factors and that therefore it must as 
well); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that after 
“[c]onsidering the three Mathews factors as they apply to Farmer,” due process required a 
hearing to challenge probable cause); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 
1998) (explaining that the determination of whether due process requires a post-restraint, 
pretrial hearing requires that the three Mathews test factors be considered); United States 
v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the due process determina-
tion for a particular setting requires an analysis consisting of the three Mathews factors).  
 113.  521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 114.  Id. at 415. 
 115.  Id. at 413, 415–16. 
 116.  Id. at 415–16. 
 117.  Id. at 416. 
 118.  Id. at 415–19. 
 119.  United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 120.  Id. at 725–26.   
 121.  Id. at 725. 
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vation of this property met the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause.122  In order to answer this question, the court determined, the 
three factors enumerated in the Mathews test must be weighed.123  The 
Moya-Gomez court indicates that application of the Mathews test is criti-
cal because without it, the present statutory scheme created by 21 
U.S.C. Section 853, the criminal forfeiture statute, provides no oppor-
tunity to question the government’s contention that certain property 
is subject to forfeiture, and therefore violated due process when the 
forfeiture renders the defendant unable to retain his or her counsel 
of choice.124 
C.  The Circuits Have Split on What Grounds an Order to Restrain 
Assets May Be Challenged During a Pretrial Hearing 
The circuits have concluded that a pretrial hearing to challenge a 
restraining order issued pursuant to the forfeiture statute is required 
to satisfy due process but split on the issue of what exactly may be 
challenged.  After applying the Mathews test, the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Moya-Gomez125 concluded that an immediate, adversarial 
hearing is required to satisfy due process, provided that the restrain-
ing order implicates funds that have been demonstrated to be neces-
sary to defendants in retaining the counsel of their choice.126  The 
Seventh Circuit, however, limited such a hearing to the issue of 
whether the assets are subject to forfeiture and noted that the court 
“may not inquire as to the validity of the indictment”127 and must ac-
cept that the probable cause decision made by the grand jury is “de-
terminative.”128  In a subsequent case, United States v. Michelle’s 
Lounge,129 the Seventh Circuit clarified a district court’s confusion in 
applying the Moya-Gomez holding.130  The Court applied the Mathews 
test and concluded that a post-seizure adversary hearing on probable 
                                                        
 122.  Id. at 726. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 729. 
 125.  860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 126.  Id. at 728–30. 
 127.  Id. at 728. 
 128.  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3386 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 129.  39 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 130.  Id. at 688, 691.  “Thus, the most accurate description of the district court’s order is 
that although it released two assets, . . . it otherwise denied Messino’s motion that Moya-
Gomez required an adversary hearing or the release of sufficient assets to pay attorney’s 
fees.  We are thus called upon to review whether Moya-Gomez’s requirements are applicable 
here.”  Id. at 691.  
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cause is required even when the assets are seized through civil forfei-
ture, provided they are needed to obtain counsel.131  The Fourth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Farmer,132 similarly limited the hearing to the 
very narrow purpose of determining whether some of the assets seized 
may have been untainted.133 
Several circuits have fallen on the other side of the spectrum, 
holding that there can never be a hearing to contest probable cause.  
For example, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jones134  held that the 
lower court may not revisit any matter to which probable cause is es-
tablished in the indictment.135  The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Ja-
mieson136 followed the Jones Court.137  The Ninth Circuit reviewed a dis-
trict court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration in a matter that 
dealt with seized funds in United States v. Dejanu.138  The Ninth Circuit 
held that a lack of new evidence is sufficient grounds alone for deny-
ing the motion.139  The Court further elaborated, however, explaining 
that a restraining order under the criminal forfeiture statute is consti-
tutional as long as the district court holds a hearing to determine 
whether probable cause exists, provided that probable cause is found 
independently from the indictment during this hearing.140 
Finally, the Second Circuit’s holdings are the most favorable for 
the defendants, such as in United States v. Monsanto,141 on remand 
from the Supreme Court.  In Monsanto, the Second Circuit explicitly 
held that grand jury determinations of probable cause may be consid-
                                                        
 131.  Id. at 700–01.  “The criminal defendant whose assets have been seized via civil for-
feiture is deprived of a significant interest just as if the assets were restrained pursuant to 
criminal forfeiture.”  Id. at 701. 
 132.  274 F.3d 800 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 133.  See id. at 801 (“[W]e . . . remand with directions to hold a hearing for the limited 
purpose of determining whether untainted assets have been seized and whether Farmer 
requires those assets to hire counsel.”).   
 134.  160 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 135.  Id. at 644. 
 136.  427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 137.  See id. at 407 (noting that “[w]e have no quarrel with the district court’s decision 
to apply Jones” particularly in light of the fact that the defendant in this case “failed to al-
lege prejudice,” had “not even voiced dissatisfaction with his two trial attorneys,” and 
“cannot show that he was deprived of counsel of his own choosing, because the record in-
dicates that his primary court-appointed attorney was, in fact, his counsel of choice”).   
 138.  37 F. App’x 870, 871 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 139.  Id. at 873. 
 140.  Id.   
 141.  924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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ered at the pretrial hearing.142  The District of Columbia Circuit in 
United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.143 followed the Second Circuit’s holding.144 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the Due 
Process Clause, even when combined with the defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment interests, does not command a pretrial hearing to con-
test the grand jury’s finding of probable cause supporting the charges 
against them.145  The Court reasoned that the decisions in Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States and United States v. Monsanto had al-
ready “cast the die” on this case as well, because these cases concluded 
that the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process and the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel do not constrain the way that federal 
forfeiture statutes apply to assets needed to retain an attorney.146 
The Kaley Court first reiterated the holding in Caplin and Drys-
dale, which concluded that a defendant does not have a Sixth 
Amendment right to spend another person’s money, even if this 
means that he will not be able to retain the attorney of his choice.147  
As the assets seized from a defendant pursuant to the forfeiture stat-
ute are considered “not rightfully his,” they cannot be spent by the 
defendant.148  The Kaley Court then looked to Monsanto, which reaf-
firmed that as long as there was probable cause, the freeze on a per-
son’s assets is valid.149 
The Kaley Court stated that the primary issue raised in this case is 
who should have the last word on probable cause, and the Court con-
cluded that the “fundamental and historic commitment of our crimi-
nal justice system is to entrust those probable cause findings to grand 
                                                        
 142.  See id. at 1199 (“[W]e concededly would require reconsideration of probable cause 
determinations made by a grand jury in the course of returning an indictment, contrary to 
the view expressed in the Senate Report.”).   
 143.  521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 144.  See id. at 419 (“We thus join the Second Circuit in holding that defendants have a 
right to an adversary post-restraint, pretrial hearing for the purpose of establishing wheth-
er there was probable cause ‘as to the defendant[s’] guilt . . . .” (citing Monsanto, 924 F.2d 
at 1195)).  
 145.  Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094, 1096 (2014).  
 146.  Id. at 1096. 
 147.  Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623–35 
(1989)). 
 148.  Id. (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626). 
 149.  Id. at 1097 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989)). 
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juries.”150  The Court first looked to precedent to support this conclu-
sion, explaining that the totality of the case law has consistently held 
that the grand jury gets to determine whether probable cause exists, 
“without any review, oversight, or second-guessing.”151  The Court 
found that similar statutes also supported the finality of the grand ju-
ry’s finding.152  The Kaley Court compared 21 U.S.C. Section 853 to 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which denies judicial reconsideration of 
an indictment returned by a proper grand jury finding probable 
cause, and explained that as such the Bail Reform Act is evidence of 
the lack of constitutional compulsion to require any additional in-
quiry.153  Finally, the Court cited a host of potential “strange and de-
structive consequences,” including the possibility for multiple, incon-
sistent findings, an undermining of the grand jury’s role in the 
criminal justice system, and the likely freezing of the prosecutor’s case 
if the grand jury determinations were allowed to be disputed during a 
pretrial hearing.154 
The Kaley Court declined to address the applicability and reach 
of the Mathews v. Eldridge155 balancing test in this situation, because 
the balancing enquiry is not capable of “trumping this Court’s repeat-
ed admonitions that the grand jury’s word is conclusive.”156  Even if it 
were able to do so, however, the Court explained that the test tips 
against the Kaleys and they would still not be entitled to a hearing to 
contest probable cause.157  When conducting the test, the Court noted 
the significant government interest in freezing potentially forfeitable 
assets and the substantial use of judicial resources that such a hearing 
would consume, as well as the heavy burden the freeze places on the 
defendants’ ability to hire the lawyer of their choice.158 
                                                        
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 1097–98 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992); and Bank of 
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988)).  
 152.  Id. at 1098 n.6.   
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 1099–1100.   
 155.  See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.  
 156.  Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1101.  
 157.  Id. (explaining that the test tips against the Kaleys because “the problem . . . comes 
from Mathews’ prescribed inquiry into the requested procedure’s usefulness in correcting 
erroneous deprivations of their private interest” and that as “a seizure of the Kaleys’ prop-
erty is erroneous only if unsupported by probable cause, the added procedure demanded 
here is not sufficiently likely to make any difference”).  
 158.  Id. at 1101–03. 
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The Court particularly emphasized the importance of the final 
prong of the test, which boils the issue down to the probable value of 
the judicial hearing in uncovering a mistaken grand jury finding of 
probable cause.159  The Court concluded that both the Supreme 
Court precedent and other courts’ experiences “indicate that a full-
dress hearing will provide little benefit” because of the relatively low 
bar set by the probable cause standard.160  The Kaley Court even went 
so far as to analyze the potential arguments that the Kaleys could pur-
sue at a pretrial hearing for assessing probable cause, including at-
tacking the evidence that the Government had previously offered in 
support of the allegations and introducing new evidence.161  Neither 
of these methods would be successful, the Court explained, because 
the adversarial process has relatively little impact on the threshold 
finding of probable cause.162  The Court then pointed out the inability 
of anyone to find a case in which an indictment had been overturned 
on rehearing because of insufficient probable cause.163 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the possibility for 
abuse by the prosecution, specifically the ability of the prosecutor to 
take away a defendant’s ability to choose his or her own counsel, im-
plicates the overall fairness of the trial, as protected by the Sixth 
Amendment.164  He contended that the deprivation of the right to 
counsel in this case is a permanent deprivation, one that is lost once 
the trial begins, and therefore the Kaleys must have an opportunity to 
meaningfully challenge that deprivation before the trial begins.165  The 
Chief Justice also disputed the majority’s application of the Mathews 
test factors, maintaining that the Kaleys’ interests at stake were 
shortchanged and the government’s interests and potential concerns 
were exaggerated.166 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even when con-
sidered in combination with an individual’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, does not command a pretrial hearing to contest the grand 
                                                        
 159.  Id. at 1103.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. at 1104. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 1107–08 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 165.  Id. at 1114. 
 166.  Id. at 1111. 
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jury’s finding of probable cause for the offenses permitting criminal 
forfeiture.167  The Kaley Court erred in concluding that this issue 
hinged on the conclusiveness of a grand jury’s determination.168  Even 
though the Court came to the correct holding, the Court used precar-
ious grounds.169  The practical result of the holding is that a traceabil-
ity hearing is required by Due Process but a probable cause hearing is 
not.170  The deference due to the grand jury is far from a settled mat-
ter,171 and as such, the Court should have instead focused on the ab-
sence of a hearing depriving an individual of the counsel of his or her 
choice.172  An infringement upon the right to counsel of choice, 
which is separate and distinct from the right to adequate counsel and 
does not apply to indigent defendants, has been deemed insufficient 
to generate a constitutional violation.173  The digression into a discus-
sion of the function and necessity of the grand jury, and the im-
portance of maintaining the finality of grand jury determinations, is 
an unnecessary and distracting detour.  This digression could poten-
tially cause confusion among the district courts when interpreting the 
Kaley decision and could be considered a violation of the Supreme 
Court’s avoidance principles.174 
A.  The Kaley Court Should Have Focused on the Conclusion That the 
Deprivation of the Right to One’s Choice of Counsel Does Not Give 
Rise to a Constitutional Violation 
The Supreme Court was correct in determining that the denial of 
a pretrial hearing does not give rise to a constitutional violation, and 
therefore such a hearing is not constitutionally required.  The Kaley 
Court failed to adequately consider, however, the central issue in the 
case: that the absence of a hearing severely limits or even eradicates 
an individual’s right to counsel of choice.175  The right to counsel of 
                                                        
 167.  Id. at 1094, 1096 (majority opinion).  
 168.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 169.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 170.  See infra Part IV.B.1.  
 171.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 172.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 173.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 174.  Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly present-
ed by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of.  This rule has found most varied application.”). 
 175.  See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102 (2014) (recognizing the right to 
counsel of choice as a “vital interest” and considering it only as a factor in the balancing 
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choice is a right described by the Court as “‘the root meaning’ of the 
Sixth Amendment” and one that “matters profoundly” to defendants 
like the Kaleys.176  Yet when considering the weight of this right in the 
framework of the Mathews balancing test—even though the Court de-
clined to consider the test’s applicability to this case it proceeded to 
undertake the analysis regardless—the Kaley Court readily dispenses 
with the right to counsel’s relevance in this context.177  The Court ac-
complishes this by reasoning that, as explained by the Monsanto 
Court, an asset freeze depriving a defendant of the counsel of his or 
her choice is only erroneous when conducted without a finding of 
probable cause.178  As the grand jury found that in this case there was 
probable cause, the burden on the right, even though “weighty,” is 
permissible.179  The Court failed to hold that the right to counsel of 
choice is a separate and distinct right from the right to counsel, and 
as the right to counsel of choice does not apply to indigent defend-
ants, the Kaleys have suffered no constitutional violation.180  It is on 
these grounds, rather than on the basis of the inviolability of the 
grand jury, that the Kaleys’ case should have been resolved. 
1.  The Right to Counsel of Choice Is a Right That Is Separate and 
Distinct from the Right to Counsel 
It is important to clarify that the right to counsel is a right that is 
separate and distinct from the right to counsel of choice.181  A viola-
tion of the right to counsel of one’s choice has been defined by the 
Supreme Court as one that is completed when a defendant has been 
“erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he 
wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received.”182  
The right to adequate counsel, in contrast, was discussed at length in 
Strickland v. Washington,183 which devised a two-part test to determine 
whether or not that right has been violated.184  The defendant first 
must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient by 
                                                        
test, but failing to consider it in the context as an enumerated right that could potentially 
give rise to a constitutional violation). 
 176.  Id. at 1102–03. 
 177.  Id. at 1103. 
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 180.  See infra note 196. 
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showing that the errors made by counsel were of such a serious nature 
that the defendant did not have “counsel” in the same sense as guar-
anteed by the Sixth Amendment, and second, the defendant must 
show that as a result of the deficient performance, the defense was 
prejudiced.185 
In contrast to the right to counsel, the right to counsel of choice 
has been repeatedly held to be a qualified right.186  In Wheat v. United 
States, the Supreme Court explained that a defendant has no right to 
counsel that he cannot afford, to counsel who declines to represent 
the defendant, or to counsel who has a conflict of interest as a result 
of representing an opposing party.187  The Gonzalez-Lopez Court noted 
further limitations on the right, including the inability of a defendant 
to be represented by a person who is not a member of the bar.188  In 
short, the Supreme Court has held that the courts have an “inde-
pendent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within 
the ethical standards of the profession” and as such, limitations of the 
right to counsel of choice can be validly imposed to accommodate 
this “institutional interest.”189 
The criminal forfeiture statute advances exactly these types of le-
gitimate institutional interests of the court, in addition to government 
institutional interests.190  Therefore limiting the right to counsel of 
choice in this instance, by denying a pretrial hearing that will contest 
an indictment allowing the seizure of assets that are intended to be 
used to retain one’s counsel of choice, is compatible with the previ-
ously held qualified nature of that right.  This is therefore not an in-
fringement that gives rise to a constitutional violation.  The Kaley 
Court could have and should have ended its analysis there, without 
unnecessarily wading into the murky waters of grand jury reviewabil-
ity. 
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2.  The Right to Counsel of Choice Does Not Apply to Indigent 
Defendants and as a Result of a Valid Indictment, the Kaleys Are 
Indigent Defendants 
Most critically, the Kaley Court failed to recognize that the right 
to counsel of choice is also not applicable to indigent defendants, and 
therefore the forfeiture of assets that renders a defendant unable to 
afford his preferred representation, while a deprivation, is not a con-
stitutional violation.191  In 1963, the Supreme Court extended the 
Powell v. Alabama holding in Gideon v. Wainwright192 by holding that 
the right to appointed counsel applied to all felony cases, including 
state crimes, in addition to capital cases.193  Less than ten years after 
Gideon, the Supreme Court extended the right to appointed counsel 
even further in Argersinger v. Hamlin,194 holding that unless the de-
fendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right to 
counsel, an individual has the right to appointed counsel in any case 
in which he or she is threatened with imprisonment, regardless of 
whether it is a misdemeanor or felony crime.195  These extensions to 
indigent defendants’ right to appointed counsel in effect bolster and 
protect their right to adequate counsel as well.  This creates a sharp 
contrast to the right to counsel of choice, which as the Gonzalez-Lopez 
Court explicitly stated, “does not extend to defendants who require 
counsel to be appointed for them.”196 
The argument has been raised that the government is attempting 
to blunt the adversary system in favor of the prosecution through the 
use of the forfeiture statute, which prevents defendants from being 
able to afford their counsel of choice.197  As the Kaley Court points 
out, however, the “majority of criminal defendants proceed with ap-
pointed counsel” and “the Court has never thought . . . that doing so 
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risks the ‘fundamental fairness of the actual trial.’”198  Publicly provid-
ed legal counsel is not a rare or uncommon occurrence; in fact, about 
three-fourths of state prison inmates and about half of those inmates 
in federal prisons reported using publically provided counsel for the 
offenses for which they were serving.199  While it is a reality that the 
sheer number of defendants unable to afford representation in com-
bination with insufficient funding and resources are challenges to the 
quality of public defenders,200 due process nevertheless sets the stand-
ard that each and every defendant receive equal, constitutionally ade-
quate treatment within the justice system.201  Placing all defendants on 
equal footing, regardless of their financial status, is a principle that 
the courts have strived to uphold.202 
Defendants who have had their assets legitimately frozen by the 
forfeiture statute in effect are placed in the same position as defend-
ants who cannot afford to pay for an attorney.203  As such, in this in-
stance, the right to counsel of choice does not apply to defendants 
such as the Kaleys, and the right to effective counsel can be satisfied 
by appointing a qualified attorney to defend them.204  If the Kaleys 
were to be treated differently by the justice system from indigent de-
fendants simply because they used to be wealthy, such treatment 
would create a different standard based on current or prior economic 
status.205  This unequal treatment could be considered a violation of 
equal protection, and thus it could be held to be unconstitutional.206  
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Provided the Kaleys’ appointed attorney meets the constitutional re-
quirements of effectiveness laid out by Powell and Strickland,207 they 
will have suffered no constitutional violation and therefore have no 
constitutional right to a pretrial hearing to challenge the deprivation 
of their assets; due process will have been satisfied.208 
B.  The Kaley Court Came to the Correct Holding but on Precarious 
Grounds 
The Kaley Court based the majority of its holding on the conclu-
siveness of the grand jury determination.209  The practical result of 
this decision is that pretrial hearings held to contest the traceability of 
assets seized are still required by due process, but a pretrial hearing 
held solely to contest a grand jury’s finding of probable cause for the 
underlying offense supporting the asset seizure is not.210  This contra-
diction is complicated by the Court’s including the Mathews balancing 
test in its analysis but explicitly choosing not to rule on the test’s ap-
plicability to this case.211  If the Mathews framework is applied to this 
issue, particularly when taking into consideration the harm that the 
grand jury institution would sustain if such a hearing was permitted, 
the Kaley holding does make more sense.  The stability and signifi-
cance of the Kaley holding, even once bolstered by the Mathews 
framework, is weakened significantly by the considerable debate over 
the importance of and deference to the grand jury institution, howev-
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er.212  It is this doubt that, even when integrating the Mathews analysis 
into the Court’s reasoning, makes the Kaley holding less than satisfy-
ing. 
1.  The Practical Result of the Kaley Holding Is That a Traceability 
Hearing Is Required by Due Process but a Probable Cause Hearing 
Is Not 
The Kaley Court did not extensively address the anomalous 
treatment that the court system gives pretrial hearings contesting the 
traceability of forfeited assets to the crime being tried, as compared to 
pretrial hearings that challenge grand jury determinations of proba-
ble cause for the underlying charges authorizing those same sei-
zures.213  It is currently undisputed among the circuit courts that due 
process requires a pretrial hearing to challenge the traceability of as-
sets frozen pursuant to the forfeiture statute.214  Not only is such a 
hearing on this issue merely allowed, it is generally considered consti-
tutionally required.215 
The only explanation that the Court offers to account for why 
traceability is subject to judicial review and probable cause is not, is 
that tracing assets is “a technical matter far removed from the grand 
jury’s core competence and traditional function.”216  This justification 
fails to explain exactly how the “technical” nature of traceability 
means that its review is required by due process but probable cause is 
not. 
It is possible that in citing the “technical” nature of traceability 
the Kaley Court was alluding to the origins of criminal forfeiture, 
which was first introduced in 1970 with the passage of the Racketeer-
ing Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).217  Until the 
RICO Act was passed, virtually no American legal precedent for the 
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forfeiture mechanism existed.218  The RICO Act was initially enacted 
as a weapon against large-scale organized crime and drug traffick-
ing.219  One of Congress’ objectives in enacting the legislation was to 
separate and protect the legitimate businesses that had been infiltrat-
ed by organized crime; as a result, only those assets that are traceable 
to, or the fruit of illegal activity, are forfeitable, rather than the entire-
ty of the defendant’s property.220 
Courts have debated over the precise definitions and quantifica-
tions of this traceability analysis, particularly in the pretrial context.221  
In 2000, Congress approved Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which preserved a defendant’s right to contest tracea-
bility, provided that the government has established the “requisite 
nexus between the property and the offense.”222  It is important to 
note, however, that this right is not a constitutional one, but merely 
one legislatively prescribed and which can be voluntarily waived.223  
The criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 853, defines the 
property forfeitable as proceeds obtained “directly or indirectly” from 
the violation and such property used to “facilitate the commission of” 
the violation, and also includes a “rebuttable presumption” provi-
sion.224  Under this provision,  the government must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the assets were acquired dur-
ing the same period in which the violation in question occurred and 
(2) that there is no likely source for the defendant to have gained this 
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property other than from the violation.225  If the government meets 
this burden of proof at trial, then the assets are presumed to be for-
feitable unless proven otherwise.226 
In light of the history of the criminal forfeiture statute, the prop-
erty rights at stake, and the nature of the analysis required, the due 
process requirement of a pretrial hearing to contest traceability of 
seized assets is logical.  In order to reconcile why the Kaley Court held 
that the probable cause pretrial hearing is not similarly required by 
due process, it is helpful to turn to the Mathews analysis.  In conduct-
ing the test, the Kaley Court considered the restraint on the defend-
ants’ ability to retain the counsel of their choice.227 The Kaley Court 
weighed this interest against the value to the government of forfei-
ture, as well as the costs and time consumed by a probable cause hear-
ing, or “mini-trial.”228  Along with this cost, the Court included the po-
tential exposure of the prosecution’s case.229  The Court considered 
this harm in light of the second prong of the Mathews analysis, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures 
used and the probable value of any procedural safeguards.230  The 
Court concluded that any deprivation of the right to counsel of 
choice would not be erroneous as a result of the Monsanto holding, 
requiring only probable cause to commit the deprivation.231  In short, 
the Kaley Court determined that the first two factors were a wash, but 
that the third prong of the test, the government’s interest, including 
the burden that the additional safeguard would entail, tipped the 
scale against the Kaleys.232 
This prong of the test in essence left the Court with two options: 
hold that the grand jury determinations of probable cause can be 
overturned by a judge at a subsequent probable cause hearing, and in 
doing so, effectively render irrelevant an institution that has been a 
part of the criminal justice system since its foundation, or alternatively 
hold that due process does not require the probable cause hearing.  
Placed between a rock and a hard place, colloquially speaking, the 
Court’s decision to forestall the application of the Mathews test and 
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instead base the holding on the grand jury’s unassailable role in the 
system becomes less of a mystery. 
2.  The Deference Due to the Grand Jury Is Far from Settled Law 
The Kaley Court based the majority of its holding on precedent 
that recognizes the grand jury’s exclusive role in determining proba-
ble cause and prohibits challenges to the reliability or sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting a grand jury’s finding of probable cause.233  
The Court explained that as a practical matter, because a grand jury 
indictment can effect a pretrial restraint on a person by restricting his 
or her liberty in such a way that is conclusive until trial, it follows that 
a higher standard is not constitutionally required for an individual’s 
property.234  In short, the Court concluded that no matter how compel-
ling an argument the Kaleys make, such a hearing cannot be required 
because of “a fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal 
justice system” to trust the grand jury to make such probable cause 
determinations.235 
The sanctity and vital nature of the role of the grand jury is not as 
clear-cut as the Kaley Court makes it out to be, however.  Scholars dis-
agree on whether grand juries are a necessary, or even advantageous, 
element of the criminal justice system.236  Most notably, the grand jury 
has been accused of being an inadequate check on over-zealous pros-
ecutions.237  The grand jury is designed to act as a screen, weeding out 
charges that are not supported by adequate evidence, shielding indi-
viduals from malicious or unwarranted prosecutions.238  In fulfilling 
this role, a grand jury is primarily responsible for hearing the prose-
cution’s side of the case, to determine if it has met its burden of 
probable cause.239  The decision does not have to be unanimous, and 
there are few limits on the types of evidence the jury can hear.240  The 
prosecutor is also not required to inform the grand jury of any evi-
dence that is favorable to the defendant.241  The result is an extremely 
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high indictment rate; for example, in one study, a 99.6% success rate 
was recorded.242  This has prompted many to allege that the grand ju-
ry is an ineffective screen, and famously, willing to “indict a ham 
sandwich” if asked.243 
The lack of restraints that are placed on the grand jury have 
caused even the Supreme Court to comment that the body is a  
“grand inquest” whose “scope of . . . inquiries is not to be limited nar-
rowly by questions of propriety” or “by doubts whether any particular 
individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.”244  
These and other concerns relating to the grand jury as an institution 
were even vocalized by the justices themselves during the Kaley oral 
arguments.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the grand jury, even 
though in theory designed to protect individuals from unfounded 
prosecutions, is “not great insulation from the overwe[e]ning power 
of the government.”245 
There is overwhelming evidence that the grand jury is not a per-
fect institution, and it is cases like the Kaleys’, which directly chal-
lenge the authority of an institution deeply entrenched within the his-
tory and values of our criminal justice system, that are particularly 
difficult to resolve.  Framing the issue in this context is a lose-lose sit-
uation—the Court cannot directly disregard or circumvent the role of 
the grand jury in determining probable cause, but upholding the 
grand jury’s determinations as unchallengeable leaves a lot of linger-
ing uncertainty over fairness and government power.  As Justice Scalia 
said in response to Howard Srebnick, who argued on behalf of the 
Kaleys that the grand jury is a one-sided presentation that does not 
give the defendant an opportunity to be adequately heard, “[w]e’ve 
been doing it for a thousand years, though, and it’s hard to say that it 
violates what our concept of fundamental fairness is.”246 
Justice Scalia’s point goes to the core of the problem: even 
though we’ve been doing it this way for many years, longevity alone 
does not mean the grand jury remains an effective screening tool in 
an evolving criminal justice system, despite its original function.247  
With criticism and doubt in the grand jury institution’s infallibility 
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both widespread and considerably well-founded, it becomes increas-
ingly clear that the Kaley Court has only opened the door for uncer-
tainty and dispute by basing its holding on the finality of the grand ju-
ry.  Instead, the Court should have looked to the lack of Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment violations as grounds for the Kaley holding. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Kaley v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Constitution does not give the defendants a right to a pretrial hearing 
to relitigate a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe 
that the defendants committed the crime charged.248  Although the 
Kaley Court came to the correct holding, the Court erred in conclud-
ing that this issue hinged on the conclusiveness of a grand jury’s de-
termination.249  The Court should have instead focused on the ab-
sence of such a hearing resulting in deprivation of the defendant’s 
access to his or her counsel of choice, which does not amount to a 
constitutional violation.250  To do otherwise would be to raise ques-
tions of efficiency, generate issues relating to equal protection, and 
most importantly, create the potential for confusion and inconsistent 
interpretations of the Kaley holding by the lower courts. 
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